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Abstract
The characteristics (or numerical patterns) of a feature vector in the transform domain of a pertur-
bation model differ significantly from those of its corresponding feature vector in the input domain.
These differences - caused by the perturbation techniques used for the transformation of feature
patterns - degrade the performance of machine learning techniques in the transform domain. In this
paper, we proposed a nonlinear parametric perturbation model that transforms the input feature
patterns to a set of elliptical patterns, and studied the performance degradation issues associated
with random forest classification technique using both the input and transform domain features.
Compared with the linear transformation such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA), the pro-
posed method requires less statistical assumptions and is highly suitable for the applications such as
data privacy and security due to the difficulty of inverting the elliptical patterns from the transform
domain to the input domain. In addition, we adopted a flexible block-wise dimensionality reduction
step in the proposed method to accommodate the possible high-dimensional data in modern appli-
cations. We evaluated the empirical performance of the proposed method on a network intrusion
data set and a biological data set, and compared the results with PCA in terms of classification
performance and data privacy protection (measured by the blind source separation attack and sig-
nal interference ratio). Both results confirmed the superior performance of the proposed elliptical
transformation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Feature vectors carry useful numerical patterns that characterize the original domain (or a sub
original domain - input domain) formed by the feature vectors themselves. Machine learning
algorithms generally utilize these patterns to generate classifiers, that can help make decisions from
data, by using supervised or unsupervised learning techniques (Suthaharan, 2015). However, certain
data science applications, such as data privacy and data security (Whitworth and Suthaharan,
2014), require the alteration of these feature patterns to protect data privacy so that it should
be difficult to recover the original patterns from the altered patterns (Little, 1993). Perturbation
models have been studied and developed for this purpose (Muralidhar and Sarathy, 2003) and
(Fienberg and Steele, 1998). The perturbation models generally transform the feature vectors from
an original domain to a new set of feature vectors within a transform domain where the data
privacy can be protected. On the other hand, the performance of machine learning algorithms can
be degraded in the transform domain due to the alternations of the patterns. Hence a significant
research has been performed to develop an efficient perturbation model to minimize the degradation
of the performance of machine learning algorithms while providing a robust protection of data
privacy. Perturbation models may be categorized into two top-level groups: parametric models and
nonparametric models. The parametric models may also be further divided into two subgroups:
vector space (or the original domain) models and feature space (or the transform domain) models.
The vector space models include the models proposed by (Muralidhar and Sarathy, 2003), in
which the authors have shown that their proposed models perform well in the original domain.
Alternatively, (Oliveira and Za¨ıane, 2004) proposed a feature space model which was constructed
using a matrix rotation, and (Lasko and Vinterbo, 2010) also developed a feature space model,
but they used a spectral analysis. They showed their proposed techniques performed well in the
transform domain. These types of models make parametric statistical assumption which in practice
can be easily violated for different types of data. As a consequence, the current techniques may not
perform as desired. A thorough review was presented in a recent paper by (Qian and Xie, 2015), in
which the authors summarized the possible types of violations of parametric assumptions, including
uncertainty in marginal distributional properties of independent variables and possible nonlinear
relationship that linear models cannot fully explore (e.g., invert-U shape (Aghion et al., 2005)).
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Figure 1: Three ellipses generated by equation (4) using 3 sets of parameter values: (0.22, 0.78,
0.1) - highlighted using Red color; (0.32, 0.68,0.04) - highlighted using Blue color; (0.1, 0.9, 0.05)
- highlighted using Green color for the parameters (a, b, α), respectively. It shows some signal
interference between the elliptical patterns distorted by the noise parameter α.
They proposed a nonparametric model based on density ratios to address these problems and
reported that the nonparametric models in general can perform better than the other parametric
models.
In this paper, we also considered a nonparametric perturbation model without imposing any
parametric assumptions on the marginal distribution of features. The main idea is to construct a
transform domain (or feature space) from the original domain using parametrized elliptical patterns
with the goals of making the restoration of the original patterns very difficult, while maintaining
a similar performance for the machine learning algorithms in both the original and the transform
domains. Our proposed approach, Elliptical Pattern Analysis (EPA), sets the criteria on privacy
strength based on blind source separation attack (Zarzoso and Nandi, 1999), because of the use of
mutual interaction between variables to construct transform domain.
Our key contribution includes the use of mutual interaction between two variables (or fea-
tures); however, this type of aggregation may jeopardize the performance of classification algo-
rithms through the loss of some of the data characteristics (or patterns). To solve this problem, we
proposed an additional data aggregation step through the random projection in the feature space
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Figure 2: Three ellipses generated by equation (4) using 3 sets of parameter values: (0.22, 0.78,
0.05) - highlighted using Red color; (0.32, 0.68,0.10) - highlighted using Blue color; (0.1, 0.9, 0.15)
- highlighted using Green color for the parameters (a, b, α), respectively. It illustrates a significant
signal interference between the ellipses distorted by a very high noise.
before applying any machine learning algorithms. The main idea is to search over possible ways
to combine pairs (or blocks) of variables to achieve efficient dimension reduction while maintaining
useful predictive information to help later-stage for machine learning algorithms. In particular,
we consider classification algorithms and use random forest classification on the reduced feature
space. By aggregating feature variables, the proposed method significantly enhances the protection
of data privacy and reduces computational cost.
2. A PERTURBATION MODEL
We define the proposed EPA approach as a model that transforms a sub original domain (input
domain) through a perturbation process such that the feature vector is altered in the transform
domain to achieve a set of specific recommended goals - the goals that lead to the protection of
data privacy and the generation of classifiers. In this section, the perturbation models is defined
using a mathematical transformation (T ) and recommended quantitative measures for quantifying
the strength of data privacy (ρ) and misclassification error (η or ζ).
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2.1 Mathematical Definition
Suppose x is a feature vector with dimension p in the input domain X, and y is its perturbed
feature vector with dimension q (where q < p) in the transform domain Y , then we define the
mathematical relationship between x and y as follows:
y = T (x), (2.1)
where the mathematical transformation T defines the proposed perturbation model, and its in-
tention is to satisfy the condition ρ(x,y) > 0 for some quantitative measure ρ. In other words,
this condition describes the difficulty of recovering the feature vector x from the feature vector y
given the transformation T and the quantitative measure ρ. One of the applications that satisfy
this type of modeling is data privacy where the owner of the data wants to share the data to an
intended user, while its privacy is protected, given the transformation T and the measure ρ are
chosen appropriately.
2.2 Problem Definition
The condition imposed on the proposed perturbation model can adversely affect other applications
that require the use of a feature vector in the transform domain to achieve similar or better clas-
sification results obtained with the feature vector of the input domain, along with data privacy.
Suppose η is a performance measure (e.g. misclassification error) of an application M , then the
performance degradation of the perturbation model T can be defined as follows:
η(M(y)) > η(M(x)), (2.2)
where y = T (x) and we define the degradation measure as follows: ζT (x,y) = η(M(x))−η(M(y)).
While it is expected that ζT (x,y) ≤ 0 for a perturbation model, it is also possible that we get
ζT (x,y) > 0; that is better performance with y for a perturbation model. The application M that
we consider in this paper is a classification technique - in particular the random forest technique -
with the misclassification error as the performance measure η.
3. THE PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
This study requires - as per the definitions and problems stated in the previous section - a perturba-
tion model T with its condition measure ρ, and an application M with its performance degradation
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measure η. They are presented in this section with a detailed discussion.
3.1 Elliptical Perturbation Model
Our feature vector x in the input domain may be represented by p variables (or features), x1, x2, . . . , xp ≥
0. We also assume p is an even integer without loss of generality. We use the proposed perturbation
on consecutive pairs of variables: (x1, x2), (x3, x4), . . . , (xp−1, xp) to generate the feature vector
y which is represented by new variables y1, y2, . . . , yq; q = p/2, respectively. Take (x1, x2) as an
example, we consider
y1 =
√
ax21 + bx
2
2 + α, (3.1)
where a and b are unknown parameters,  ∼ N(0, 1) and α determines the strength of noise degra-
dation. To further simplify the process, we can assume a+ b = 1 and a, b ≥ 0. The model reduces
to the standard linear model when a → 0 or a → 1. The nonlinear transformation
√
ax21 + bx
2
2
defines the elliptical perturbation model and describes the nonlinear mutual interaction between
the feature variables x1 and x2.
On one hand, we can choose the value for a such that the classification results using y and x are
significantly close to each other (i.e., ζT ∼ 0). On the other hand, we can choose a to minimize the
absolute value of correlations between y1 and (x1, x2). Meanwhile, noise strength α will be tuned
to achieve the intended goal (e.g. data privacy determined by ρ) of the perturbation model. In the
model building process, we will use this correlation-minimization to tune the parameter a.
3.2 Elliptical Patterns Visualization
The visual interpretation of the studied model in equation (3.1) is presented in Fig. 1. We have
illustrated the elliptical characteristics of the model by fixing the variable y to a single value and
varying the values of the parameters a, b, and α. For simplicity, we have selected y = 1, and a
set of values (0.22, 0.78, 0.03), (0.32, 0.68, 0.04), and (0.1, 0.9, 0.05) for the parameters a, b, α,
respectively. The model in equation (3.1), with these values, provides the three elliptical patterns
with interference characteristics as illustrated in Fig. 1. In order to generate these elliptical
patterns, we transform equation (3.1) as follows:
x2 =
√
(y1 − α)2 + ax21
b
, (3.2)
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It clearly shows the difficulty of finding a pair of (x1, x2) for a given value of y1 under a scaled
noise degradation due to elliptical interference. To illustrate the strength of the model visually, we
increased the values of α from 0.03, 0.04, and 0.05 to 0.05, 0.1, and 0.15, respectively, and generated
the values of x2. The results are presented in Fig. 2. It clearly displays a stronger interference
(or cross talk) between the elliptical models with respect to the values of a. The measure of this
interference will help to determine parameters of the model for the protection of data privacy. We
treat this interference as signal interference and apply blind signal separation approaches (Zarzoso
and Nandi, 1999) to determine the strength of data privacy.
3.3 Blind Source Separation
The blind source separation (BSS) is one of the classical techniques that is capable of separating
the original signals from their copies of modulated signals without having any prior information
about the original signals (Zarzoso and Nandi, 1999). The recent studies show that BSS is even
capable of handling multidimensional data, like images and video (or image sequences) (Sørensen
and De Lathauwer, 2013). Therefore, we have adopted this technique as an attack approach (Liu
et al., 2008) for the proposed perturbation model and derive robust parameters for the model. The
standard measure used with BSS technique (or the attack) is called the Signal Interference Ratio
(SIR), which is defined by the following fraction:
ρ =
psm
pct
, (3.3)
where psm and pct stand for the power of modulated signal and the power of cross-talk between
the co-channels, respectively. The ratio ρ is measured in decibel dB. When the denominator -
power of cross-talk - increases, the ratio ρ decreases, and it is hard to recover the source signals
from the modulated signals. This fraction is defined based on the information available at https:
//cran.r-project.org/web/packages/JADE/index.html. It means that lower the SIR the higher
the strength of modulation. The BSS technique states that if the SIR value is greater than 20 dB
then the source signals (x1 and x2) are recoverable from y1, and if the SIR values is less than or
equal to 20 dB then source signals are not recoverable (Boscolo et al., 2004), (Caiafa and Proto,
2005). We use this for the validation of proposed perturbation model.
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3.4 Random Forest Classification
Among many classification techniques in a machine learning system, we have selected the random
forest technique (Breiman, 2001) for our research, because of its ability to address multi-class
classification problem better than many other machine learning techniques, including support vector
machine (Jeyakumar et al., 2014; Suthaharan, 2016) and decision tree (Murthy, 1998). The random
forest classifiers divide the data domain efficiently using bootstrapping technique - used to generate
random decision trees - and Gini index - used to split the tree nodes. Hence it is highly suitable
for the classification objectives of a large and imbalanced data set with many features.
3.5 Misclassification and OOB Errors
Several measures have been used to quantify the performance of classification techniques in machine
learning; among them out-of-bag (OOB) error and misclassification errors are the most commonly
used errors for the random forest classifiers (Breiman, 1996). OOB error is defined by the ratio
between the total number of misclassified items from a set and the total number of items in the
set. Similarly the misclassification error of a class is defined by the ratio between the number of
misclassified items in the class and the total number of items in the class. We have used both of
these quantitative measures to evaluate the performance of random forest classification algorithm
in the input domain as well in the transform domain with the proposed perturbation model, and
compare the results.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We studied the performance degradation of random forest classifiers using the proposed ellipti-
cal perturbation model and the highly imbalanced NSL-KDD data set (http://www.unb.ca/cic/
research/datasets/nsl.html), which we downloaded and used it in a previous research (Sutha-
haran and Panchagnula, 2012). This data set has 25,192 observations with 41 network traffic
features and 22 network traffic classes. We labeled the entire feature vector as (f1, f2, . . . , f41),
and reduced it later to a lower-dimensional feature vector, based on their importance to random
forest classification. This data set forms the original domain and we represented this data set as
“dataset-O”. In this data set, the normal traffic class and the Neptune attack class have large
number of observations, compared to other attack classes; hence, it provides a highly imbalanced
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data set.
Table 1: Statistical information of different traffic types in the NSL-KDD data set used - number
of observations greater than or equal to 30.
Label Traffic #Obs. Label Traffic #Obs.
0 Normal 13449 11 guess pwd 10
1 Neptune 8282 12 ftp write 1
2 back 196 13 multihop 2
3 Warezclient 181 14 warezmaster7
4 ipsweep 710 15 loadmodule 1
5 portsweep 587 16 spy 1
6 teardrop 188 17 imap 5
7 nmap 301 18 buf ovrflow 6
8 satan 691 19 land 1
9 smurf 529 20 phf 2
10 pod 38 21 rootkit 4
The network traffic details of this data set presented in Table 1 clearly show the imbalanced
nature of the data set between normal and attack traffic classes, and among the attack traffic
classes. The first 11 traffic classes (labeled 0 to 10) presented in this table have more than 30
observations, and the next 11 traffic classes (labeled 11 to 21) have much less than 30 observations.
One of the goals is to study the effect of the proposed perturbation model on the performance of
random forest classifiers using the first 11 traffic classes only; however, we will use the other 11
traffic classes to understand imbalanced nature of the data and its significance to random forest
classification.
4.1 Feature Selection using Random Forest
There are 41 features - as we denoted by (f1, f2, . . . , f41) earlier - in the dataset-O, and this feature
vector determines the dimensionality 41 of the original domain; however, not necessarily all of these
features contribute to the classification performance of random forest. To prepare the data set for
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our experiments and select the important features for classification, we first removed the categorical
variables (or features) along with the features that overshadow the other features due to outliers.
We then applied random forest classification to determine the importance of features by ordering
them based on their misclassification errors.
Using the approach suggested by (Zumel et al., 2014), and by removing the least important
feature from the feature vector one-by-one, while performing random forest classification repeat-
edly until a change in misclassification error can be observed. This process resulted in a lower-
dimensional data set with 16 features, (f33, f4, f32, f6, f36, f20, f28, f19, f31, f27, f9, f29, f8, f23,
f37, f30) in the decreasing order of importance. Hence, we have reduced the data set to a data set
(p = 16) with the most important feature vector that contributes to random forest classification.
For simplicity, we represented these features by (x1, x2, . . . , x16) respectively. Therefore, the dimen-
sion of the input domain of the proposed perturbation model is p = 16 with 25,192 observations,
16 network traffic features, and 22 network traffic classes. Let’s represent this dimension-reduced
data set for the input domain as “dataset-I”.
4.2 Transform Domain Pattern Analysis
The next step is to build the perturbation model, using the dataset-I as the input domain and
construct the transform domain so that the random forest classifiers can be evaluated. Due to
the pairing of features, multiple elliptical perturbation models were generated by selecting suitable
parameters for the model, and they are discussed in the subsections below.
Multiple Model Generation The proposed theoretical model for a single pair of features was pre-
sented in equation (3.1), which is applied to every consecutive pair of features: (x1, x2), (x3, x4),
. . . , (x15, x16) associated with the input domain; however, one can apply different techniques to
select and combine the features. The pairing of these sixteen features of the input domain can give
8 models Mi with new features yi for transform domain as follows:
yi =
√
aix22i−1 + (1− ai)x22i + α, (4.1)
where i = 1 . . . 8; hence, we have 8 different models with elliptical patterns that form the transform
domain with dimension 8. It is obvious that the parameters ai, i = 1 . . . , 8 together, and α
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contribute to the elliptical patterns and their distortion, and in turn contribute to the robustness
of the proposed perturbation model to privacy attacks. They also contribute to the performance
degradation of random forest classifiers in the transform domain. Therefore, a trade-off mechanism
is required to achieve a strong privacy protection and a low misclassification error. The SIR
measure is a flexible quantifier that allows a wide range of values to quantify the strength of
privacy protection against BSS attack. The next subsection describes the empirical approach
where we utilized this measure to find a set of values for the parameters ai, i = 1 . . . , 8 by fixing
α = 0.001.
Parameter Selection for the Models We used Monte Carlo approach with the JADE implementation
of SIR computation to assess BSS attack empirically. In this implementation, multiple copies of
modulated source signals are generated using random weights, and then a SIR value is calculated to
determine if the source signals are recoverable (if SIR is greater than 20dB then source signals are
recoverable, otherwise they are not) from the multiple modulated signals. In our implementation,
the feature pair (x2i−1,x2i), i = 1, . . . , 8 is considered as source signals, and yi is considered as their
modulated signal. To create, multiple copies of modulated signal yi, using (x2i−1,x2i), we generated
several values for ai randomly from Uniform distribution, and used them in equation (4.1). We
then used the Monte Carlo approach to achieve desired results.
The Monte Carlo approach, combined with the JADE application of SIR and BSS attack pro-
vided us with the three values 0.042, 0.021, 0.096, which we selected for a1, a2, and a3. To cut down
the computational cost of Monte Carlo approach, we used them repeatedly for the parameters ai
as follows: a1 = 0.042, a2 = 0.021, a3 = 0.096, a4 = 0.042, a5 = 0.021, a6 = 0.096, a7 = 0.042,
and a8 = 0.021 for the 8 models, respectively. We obtained the SIR values for these parameters:
14.289, 10.983, 7.873, 11.483, 11.758, 12.608, 14.675, 16.235, respectively - the values less than
20dB indicate the source signal separation is difficult; hence, BSS attack is not possible. We can
also see, each model has different privacy strengths, for example, model M3 is much stronger than
model M8 against BSS attack. Therefore, in this step, we generated a data set for the transform
domain, and it has 25,192 observations with 8 newly defined traffic features (yi, i = 1, . . . , 8) and
22 network traffic classes. Let’s represent this transform domain data set as “dataset-T”.
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4.3 Performance Degradation Evaluation
We divided the performance degradation evaluation task into two experiments: “experiment with
full-imbalanced data sets”, and “experiment with reduced-imbalanced data sets”. In the first
experiment, we used the data sets dataset-I and dataset-T to compare the performance of random
forest in both the input domain and transform domain. These two data sets have all 22 network
traffic types with their full imbalanced traffic nature. As listed in Table 1, there are 11 traffic types
with much fewer than 30 observations (totaling 40 observation) - the removal of these traffic types
may influence the classification results. Hence, for the second experiment, we created two new data
sets, dataset-IR and dataset-TR, from dataset-I and dataset-T, respectively. We removed the 40
observations related to these 11 traffic types. Hence the dataset-IR has 25,152 observations with
dimension 16 and 22 traffic classes, and the dataset-TR has 25,152 observations with dimension 8
and 22 traffic classes.
Experiment with full-imbalanced data sets: We used both dataset-I and dataset-T to compare the
performance of random forest classifiers in input domain and transform domain respectively. We
conducted this experiment to evaluate the classification performance using random forest with the
original (unprotected features) and transformed variables (protected features). The idea is to ana-
lyze the performance of random forest if the training is performed on these two full-imbalanced data
sets. Therefore, we used both OOB error and misclassification error to compare the performances.
OOB error The OOB errors and misclassification errors are presented in Tables 2 and 3 in
their second and third columns, respectively. The tables also provide the information of the tuples,
correctly classified and misclassified number of observations, for each class in input domain - denoted
by (idcc, idmc) - and transform domain - denoted by (tdcc, tdmc), respectively. In the tables, the
OOB errors are calculated as a single measure for the classification performance on the set, thus
we have a single value of 0.0098 for input variables (unprotected features), 0.0169 for transformed
variables (protected features). If we round these values to the second decimal places, we get 0.01
and 0.02 OOB errors, making it 1% error difference in the performance degradation - input domain
versus transform domain. We can see that the perturbation model increases the OOB error slightly
while protecting data privacy.
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Table 2: Input Domain: Random forest classification results of NSL-KDD data with original fea-
tures and full-imbalanced data
Label OOB errors Misclassification errors
Normal 0.0098 0.005 (13379, 70)
Neptune 0.0098 0.003 (8256, 26)
back 0.0098 0.025 (191, 5)
warezclient 0.0098 0.127 (158, 23)
ipsweep 0.0098 0.026 (691, 19)
portsweep 0.0098 0.017 (577, 10)
teardrop 0.0098 0.010 (186, 2)
nmap 0.0098 0.086 (275, 26)
satan 0.0098 0.041 (662, 29)
smurf 0.0098 0.015 (521, 8)
pod 0.0098 0.184 (31, 7)
Misclassification error Similarly, by comparing misclassification errors presented in Table 2 and
Table 3, we observed that the perturbation model has a higher misclassification errors as expected,
showing the characteristics of a perturbation model. As we can observe, the misclassification
errors are increased, except for the traffic types ipsweep, teardrop, and pod. However, the error
differences are significantly lower; hence, the perturbation model helps achieve both the protection
of data privacy and the classification performance of random forest.
Experiment with reduced-imbalanced data sets We used dataset-IR and dataset-TR to compare
the performance of random forest classifiers in input and transform domains for the purpose of
this experiment. It means only the 11 traffic types with more than 30 observations were classified
to study if there was any significant effect due to the elimination of other traffic types that have
significantly lower number of observations. The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5, and we
can observe similar patterns between the input domain and transform domain results. Hence,
comparing the results in Tables 2 and 4, we can see that the OOB error has slightly decreased due
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Table 3: Transform Domain: Random forest classification results of NSL-KDD data with EPA
transformed features and full-imbalanced data
Label OOB errors Misclassification errors
Normal 0.0169 0.009 (13322, 127)
Neptune 0.0169 0.009 (8205, 77)
back 0.0169 0.041 (188, 8)
warezclient 0.0169 0.232 (139, 42)
ipsweep 0.0169 0.021 (695, 15)
portsweep 0.0169 0.063 (550, 37)
teardrop 0.0169 0.005 (187, 1)
nmap 0.0169 0.116 (266, 35)
satan 0.0169 0.063 (647, 44)
smurf 0.0169 0.045 (505, 24)
pod 0.0169 0.053 (36, 2)
to the reduced-imbalanced nature of traffic types, as expected. Similarly, comparing the results
in Tables 3 and 5, we can see the reduction in the OOB error, and an overall reduction in the
misclassification errors.
4.4 Overall Performance Degradation
Although, the results presented in the previous section provide information to compare the perfor-
mance degradation of the random forest classifiers between the input domain and the transform
domain, it is important to understand the overall performance degradation to conclude if the pro-
posed perturbation is meaningful. Therefore, to estimate the percentage performance degradation,
we defined a simple measure:
pdt =
tdmct − idmct
tott
. (4.2)
For example, the transform domain misclassification (tdmct) of traffic type “normal” is 127 (from
Table 3), and the input domain misclassification (idmct) of traffic type “normal” is 70 (from Table
2). Also the total number of observations of “normal” traffic class is 13449 (Table 1). Therefore,
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Table 4: Input Domain: Random forest classification results of NSL-KDD data with original fea-
tures and reduced-imbalanced data
Label OOB errors Misclassification errors
Normal 0.0088 0.005 (13381, 68)
Neptune 0.0088 0.003 (8253, 29)
back 0.0088 0.025 (191, 5)
warezclient 0.0088 0.127 (158, 23)
ipsweep 0.0088 0.025 (692, 18)
portsweep 0.0088 0.013 (579, 8)
teardrop 0.0088 0.010 (186, 2)
nmap 0.0088 0.093 (273, 28)
satan 0.0088 0.044 (660, 31)
smurf 0.0088 0.015 (521, 8)
pod 0.0088 0.210 (30, 8)
the percentage degradation of random forest by the proposed perturbation model for the “normal”
class is 0.4238233. Similarly, we calculated the percentage degradations for other 10 traffic types
with full-imbalanced data sets, and listed all of them in Table 6 (column 2). We also calculated
the same for reduced-imbalanced data sets, and provided the results in column 3 of Table 6. Note
that a positive value indicates it is a degradation over input domain to transform domain, whereas,
a negative value indicates there is an improvement over input domain to transform domain. The
average degradations over all the class types are 1.05% for full-imbalanced data sets, and 0.45% for
reduced-imbalanced data sets - indicating additional average degradation of 1.05% when the full-
imbalanced data is used, additional average degradation of 0.45% when reduced-imbalanced data
is used, and the difference shows the use of additional imbalanced data affects the performance
negatively.
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Table 5: Transform Domain: Random forest classification results of NSL-KDD data with EPA
transformed features and reduced-imbalanced data
Label OOB errors Misclassification errors
Normal 0.0156 0.009 (13322, 127)
Neptune 0.0156 0.009 (8207, 75)
back 0.0156 0.040 (188, 8)
warezclient 0.0156 0.220 (141, 40)
ipsweep 0.0156 0.022 (694, 16)
portsweep 0.0156 0.061 (551, 36)
teardrop 0.0156 0.005 (187, 1)
nmap 0.0156 0.102 (270, 31)
satan 0.0156 0.059 (650, 41)
smurf 0.0156 0.039 (508, 21)
pod 0.0156 0.053 (36, 2)
5. COMPETING METHODS AND DISCUSSION
We have selected PCA as the competing method to evaluate the performance of the proposed
EPA approach. PCA is a classical linear transformation which transforms the original features to
principal components (PCs), hence achieves effective dimension reduction (Du and Swamy, 2014).
It has been extensively used in modern applications, including atmospheric science (Jolliffe and
Cadima, 2016), neuroscience (Lee et al., 2016), and neuroimaging (Jones et al., 2007). It became
popular in the last two decades because of the recent developments in computer technology that can
help the application of PCA to high dimensional large data sets. However, it generally suffers from
two major drawbacks as reported in (Bruce and Bruce, 2017). One of them is the strong statistical
assumptions and the second one is the difficulty of selecting the number of PCs for dimensionality
reduction and achieve data utility.
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Table 6: Performance degradation of random forest classifiers over input domain to EPA trans-
formed domain using full/reduce-imbalanced data
Label (t) Full-Imb. (pdt) Reduced-Imb. (pdt)
Normal 0.4238233 0.4386943
Neptune 0.6157933 0.5554214
back 1.5306122 1.5306122
warezclient 10.4972376 9.3922652
ipsweep -0.5633803 -0.2816901
portsweep 4.5996593 4.7700170
teardrop -0.5319149 -0.5319149
nmap 2.9900332 0.9966777
satan 2.1707670 1.4471780
smurf 3.0245747 2.4574669
pod -13.1578947 -15.7894737
AVG. ERR. 1.054483 0.4532049
5.1 Comparative Analysis
The results of PCA transformation - applied to the full-imbalanced NSL-KDD data - are presented
in Table 7 and they can be compared with the results of the proposed EPA approach (applied to
the same data) in the second column of Table 6. We adopted two criterion to extract number of
PCs: eigenvalue greater than 1 criterion (i.e., Kaiser-Guttman criterion) as used in (Hung et al.,
2016) and 80% cumulative variance rule as stated in (Bruce and Bruce, 2017). The number of PCs
selected by these criterion are 5 and 6, respectively. The random forest classification results (pdt)
using the first 5 PCs and 6 PCs of this data are presented in the second and third columns of Table
7.
General Analysis The results in the second columns of Tables 6 and 7 show that the average
performance degradation caused by PCA with 5 PCs is higher (almost double) than the degradation
caused by the proposed EPA approach. In contrast, the results in the third column suggests a
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smaller degradation is possible if 6 PCs are used. These results, with the use of higher number
of PCs, PCA can achieve better classification accuracy; however, it also suggests the proposed
approach can be competitive too.
Specific Analysis In network security, Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is generally considered a
major threat to network users and the servers. Therefore, the classification of Normal traffic
and DoS attacks are very important. The DoS attack includes the attacks such as Neptune,
Back, Teardrop, Smurf and Pod (Jin et al., 2007) and they are included in NSL-KDD data set as
well. Therefore, we calculated the performance degradation (pdt) for these attacks separately and
obtained -1.35, 1.97, and 0.67 for EPA, PCA with 5 PCs, and PCA with 6PCs, respectively. The
negative value, as stated earlier, indicates an improvement in the performance; thus, It shows the
proposed EPA is superior than PCA when the classification of DoS attacks are considered.
In terms of invertible characteristics, according to (Geiger, 2014), it is possible to invert PCA
with an estimate of the covariance matrix; hence, it is relatively weaker than the proposed EPA
approach when the applications such as data privacy and security are considered. However, in terms
of dimension reduction, PCA can be superior than the proposed method because it can reduce the
dimension by more than 50%, whereas the proposed EPA approach has the fixed 50% dimension
reduction.
5.2 Evaluation using IRIS plant data set
We also used the iris plant dataset to evaluate and compare EPA and PCA transformations. This
dataset is a simple, yet effective dataset, which has been used in machine learning extensively for
the last several decades (Chaudhary et al., 2016; Timo´n et al., 2016; Lin et al., 2017). We obtained
this data from the UCI Machine Learning Repository (Lichman, 2013). Random forest is applied
to the original iris data, OOB errors are calculated and presented in the second column of Table 8.
The data is then transformed into PCs using PCA. The random forest classification is applied using
all the PCs and the OOB results are presented in the third column of Table 8. We also transformed
the data set using the proposed EPA transformation and the applied random forest classification.
The OOB results of the proposed approach is presented in the fourth column of the table. Note
that the first column of the table shows the three classes of the iris plant. Comparing the results
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Table 7: Performance degradation of random forest classifiers over input domain to PCA trans-
formed domain using full-imbalanced data only
Label (t) Full-Imb. 5PC (pdt) Full-Imb. 6PC (pdt)
Normal 0.3345974 0.1487099
Neptune 0.4829751 0.4346776
back 13.7755102 10.7142857
warezclient 7.1823204 3.3149171
ipsweep 0.4225352 0.7042254
portsweep 1.8739353 1.7035775
teardrop -0.5319149 -0.5319149
nmap 0.9966777 0.3322259
satan 0.8683068 0.5788712
smurf 5.6710775 6.4272212
pod -7.8947368 -13.1578947
AVG. ERR. 2.107389 0.9699002
in Table 8, we can say that the proposed transformation provides the classification results closer to
the results of random forest applied to the original data than the principal components.
6. CONCLUSION
This study allowed us to understand the variations caused by the perturbation models between
their input domain and transform domain characteristics or numerical patterns. This knowledge
helped us construct a parametric perturbation model using an elliptical transformation along with
an additive Gaussian noise degradation. The degradation performance analysis using random
forest classifiers together with blind source separation attack and quantitative measures - signal
interference ratio, OOB error, and misclassification error - showed that the parametric elliptical
perturbation model performed very well in the classification of network intrusion and biological
data, while protecting data privacy patterns of feature vectors of the data.
Compared with classical linear transformations such as PCA, the proposed method requires less
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Table 8: OOB errors of three cases using IRIS plant data set
Class OOB: RF OOB: RF-PCA OOB: RF-EPA
Setosa 0.00 0.00 0.00
Versicolor 0.08 0.12 0.12
Virginica 0.06 0.10 0.06
statistical assumptions on the data and is highly suitable for the applications such as data privacy
and security as a result of the difficulty of inverting the elliptical patterns from the transform
domain to the input domain. In addition, we adopted a flexible block-wise dimension reduction
step in the proposed method to accommodate the possible high-dimensional data (p  n) in
modern applications, in which PCA is not directly applicable. The empirical performance results
also confirmed the superior performance of the proposed EPA approach over the widely used PCA.
Several future directions still remain of interest in our research agenda. First, the current paper
mainly discusses pairing of two features (block size is 2) and fixed projections. It is possible to
consider larger block sizes and random projections to reduce computation complexity. Second,
model (3) can be extended by replacing the constraint a+ b = 1 with flexible alternatives, and by
considering a diagonal elliptical models.
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